O ESTADO DE DIREITO, A QUEBRA DO PARADIGMA POSITIVISTA E O SURGIMENTO DO ATIVISMO JUDICIAL.

​In risposta all’ipotesi di estendere la categoria del falso valutativo alle motivazioni di una sentenza, l’articolo tenta una ricostruzione critica della progressiva apertura del falso intellettuale ad atti dispositivi e giudizi tecnici, ponendone in evidenza alcune aporie e proponendo specifici temperamenti. Tanto la teoria dei fatti psichici, quanto quella delle attestazioni implicite e del vero legale, nella loro congiunta sovrapposizione alla struttura della fattispecie penale, possono scadere in una violazione del divieto di analogia in materia penale. Il caso da cui (...) parte l’analisi attiene una procedura di selezione per la chiamata di professore universitario di prima fascia e la sentenza del T.A.R. che decide sul ricorso di un candidato. Falsity of the judicial decision. Implicit statements, legal truth and technical judgments. In response to the hypothesis of extending the category of "evaluative" falsehood to the motivations of a judicial decision, the paper attempts a critical reconstruction of the progressive evolution of these crimes in matter of acts of will and technical judgments, highlighting some aporias and proposing some corrections. Both the theory of psychic facts, as well as the theory of implicit attestations and the legal truth, in their joint action, can violate the prohibition of analogical interpretation in criminal matters. The controversial case from which the analysis starts concerns a public competition for a university professorship and the T.A.R.’s judgment that decides on a candidate's appeal. (shrink)

L’articolo ripercorre i principali snodi interpretativi riguardanti la rilevanza penale delle false attestazioni in dichiarazioni sostitutive di certificati e atti notori disciplinate dagli artt. 46 e 47 del D.P.R. n. 445/2000, analizzando le modifiche apportate dai decreti Rilancio e Semplificazioni, nonché i peculiari problemi connessi all’uso di questo strumento istruttorio per la concessione della garanzia statale sui finanziamenti alle imprese. SOMMARIO: 1. Premesse. La semplificazione delle procedure amministrative per l’ottenimento di benefici economici. – 2. Le dichiarazioni sostitutive di certificati e (...) atti notori. – 3. Conseguenze penali delle false attestazioni. Il falso ideologico del privato in atto pubblico. – 3.1. (segue) Il falso per induzione nelle premesse descrittive dell’atto di concessione del beneficio. – 3.1.2. (segue) Interazione tra la condotta del privato e i poteri di controllo sulla sua veridicità del p.u. – 3.1.3. (segue) La struttura logica dello schema della presupposizione. – 4. La garanzia sui finanziamenti concessa da SACE Spa. – 4.2. (segue) Profili di rilevanza penale. – 4.2. (segue) Profili di rilevanza penale della dichiarazione sostitutiva di atto notorio di cui all’art. 1 bis del decreto liquidità. L’attestazione che il finanziamento è destinato a sostenere costi relativi a stabilimenti aventi sede in Italia. – 4.3. (segue) Le altre attestazioni richieste dall’art. 1 bis. – 4.4. (segue) La deroga al potere-dovere di controllo preventivo sulla veridicità dell’autodichiarazione. Operatività del falso per induzione. – 5. Conclusioni. (shrink)

Abstract. Con il presente contributo si propone una rilettura critica del concetto di “verità legale”, ove propugnato per estendere l’area di prensione punitiva delle false comunicazioni sociali anche ai giudizi discrezionali. Il disaccordo con l’impianto motivazionale delle Sezioni Unite – nel contesto argomentativo dei valori monetari intesi come “traduzione” di fatti obbiettivi – si radica in particolare nell’assunto del «ridotto margine di opinabilità» delle scienze contabili. L’affermazione, come si vedrà, è foriera di fraintendimenti. Si attribuisce al parametro adottato (normativo prima (...) che scientifico) proprietà che non gli appartengono, legittimandolo ad integrare il contenuto della norma penale. Il “falso per inosservanza” assume, così, i connotati di un mero strumento sanzionatorio in bianco di regole tracciate altrove, con ripercussioni tanto nella prospettiva della riserva di legge, quanto in ordine alla genericità del precetto. SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. – 2. Una distanza incolmabile tra fatto e giudizio. – 3. All’origine dei “fatti materiali”. Raffronto con la frode fiscale previgente. – 4. Raffronto con il falso societario previgente. Tra indici positivi contrastanti e ambiguità terminologiche. – 5. La materialità nella mutata economia della fattispecie. – 6. La soluzione della sentenza Giovagnoli – 7. La mutata prospettiva delle Sezioni Unite e le scienze a ridotto margine di opinabilità. – 8. Dalla realtà obiettiva all’obiettività della sua rappresentazione. – 9. I limiti dell’equiparazione fatto-giudizio. Trascurabilità del margine d’errore e mero accertamento tecnico. – 10. Il parametro della verità coerente nella sentenza Coopcostruttori. – 11. Conclusioni. (shrink)

O objectivo primário do presente artigo é estudar algumas das implicações, sobretudo epistemológicas, associadas com o auto-intitulado movimento da Física Ariana (Deutsche Physikj, movimento esse que aqui se considera como tendo sido iniciado pelos físicos, laureados com o Prémio Nobel, Philipp Lenard e Johannes Stark. Assim, em primeiro lugar, procura-se analisar questões como a da ligação entre ciência e raça, a da função do método experimental e do método dedutivo nas descobertas das ciências naturais, bem como a da relação entre (...) matemática e natureza, já para não mencionar a dimensão histórica da ciência. Em vez de recorrer a conceitos supostamente puros do que sejam ciência ou racionalidade em ordem a instaurar um tribunal da história, cujo veredicto seria a condenação da Física Ariana como irrisória anomalia epistemológica no corpo histórico da ciência, os autores do presente artigo procuram, antes de mais, traçar a origem do movimento a partir das biografias de Lenard e Stark, acreditando que o carácter profundamente conturbado de ambos, coadunado com a conflituosa situação política que antecedeu a ascensão de Hitler ao poder na Alemanha em 1933, seriam razões suficientes para a formação das doutrinas que atacavam a Física Teórica. Nesse sentido, depois de expor os princípios e as ideias defendidas pelos físicos arianos, os autores procuram evidenciar até que ponto uma análise restrita ao campo da física e dos seus documentos não é suficiente para uma compreensão cabal de tal movimento. Ao mesmo tempo, procuram mostrar também por que razão é necessário considerar que algumas objecções levantadas contra a física teórica se constituíam como problemas verdadeiramente relevantes, sendo que alguns deles foram também formulados por autores que não pactuavam com as convicções políticas de Lenard e Stark. Finalmente, o artigo comporta uma análise das posições defendidas por Werner Heisenberg em ordem a mostrar a seriedade com a qual as críticas dos físicos arianos foram recebidas por este autor, nelas reconhecendo algo digno de ser respondido, e isso não meramente por razões políticas, mas antes porque constituíam dilemas reais instalados na prática das ciências naturais. Ou seja, recorrendo aos argumentos esgrimidos por Werner Heisenberg, os autores do artigo pretendem demonstrar que a Física Ariana não merece atenção apenas na sua qualidade de aberração histórica, mas também pelo facto de ela ter levantado questões ainda hoje epistemologicamente relevantes. /// The primary aim of the present article is to study some of the implications, particularly the epistemological ones, associated with the movement of the so called German Physics (Deutsche PhysikJ, a movement that in this article is mainly associated with the work of the physicists, and Nobel laureates, Phillip Lenard and Johannes Stark. The article begins by analyzing questions related to the connection established between science and race, as well as to the function of the experimental and deductive methods in the discoveries of the natural sciences, not to mention the problems associated with the relation between mathematics and nature as well as the historical dimension of science. The goal, therefore, is not to take supposedly pure concepts about what science and rationality might be and establish them as judges in the tribunal of history, whose verdict would be the condemnation of the German Physics as an insignificant epistemological anomaly within the historical body of science. Rather, the authors of the article want to trace the origin of the movement of the German Physics by reading the biographies of Lenard and Stark, whereby it is assumed that the problematic character of these physicists together with the political situation that anteceded Hitlers ascension to power in Germany in 1933 would be reason enough for the formation of doctrines directed against theoretical physics. In this sense, after expounding the principles and the doctrines defended by the Arian physicists, the authors of the article show that an analysis circumscribed to the domain of physics would not be sufficient for a global understanding of this movement. At the same time, however, the authors also want to show the reason why it is necessary to consider some of the objections raised against theoretical physics as serious problems, even though some of them were also formulated by authors that did not share the political convictions of Lenard and Stark. Finally, the article contains an analysis of the positions defended by Werner Heisenberg in order to demonstrate the seriousness with which the criticisms of the Arian physicists were received by this most important author, so much so that he recognized in them something worth a response, and this not only for political reasons, but also because he recognized the problems raised as a dilemma situated at the very heart of the practice of the natural sciences. In other words, by a close reading of the arguments presented by Werner Heisenberg, the authors of the article want to demonstrate that the movement of German Physics is worth attention not only in its quality as an historical aberration, but also due to the fact that it raised questions that are still epistemologically relevant. (shrink)

Este artigo, um recorte de pesquisa de Doutorado, objetiva desvelar as percepções de 208 professores de filosofia do Paraná no sentido de buscar evidenciar quais seriam as especificidades da disciplina de filosofia em relação a outras disciplinas do currículo. Inicialmente, disserta-se sobre a intermitência da disciplina de Filosofia no currículo da Educação Básica, com base em Deleuze e Guattari (2010), os quais demarcam o entendimento da filosofia como criação de conceitos. Em seguida, fundamentado em Rodrigues e Gelamo (2019), entre outros (...) autores, reflete-se sobre o modo de compreender a filosofia, que pode oscilar entre uma compreensão enciclopédica com base na memorização dos sistemas filosóficos e experiência filosófica. Por fim, por meio da análise de conteúdo de Bardin (2016), a seguinte questão de um questionário que envolvia outras dez foi analisada: “Você acredita que a filosofia proporciona espaços ou momentos diferenciados em relação aos das outras disciplinas? Se sim, no que ela se diferencia?”. Das respostas dos 208 docentes, emergiram as seguintes categorias: criar conceitos, espaço para o debate/reflexão de ideias, possibilidade da experiência filosófica e superar o senso comum. Os resultados apontam, assim, em um sentido de que a disciplina de filosofia não deve limitar-se a um conhecimento enciclopédico, mas, sim, trata-se de um conhecimento que se relaciona com o cotidiano de seus interlocutores. Faz-se necessário, porém, um saber valorizar adequadamente a história da filosofia, pois, ao valorizar demais a história da filosofia, pode-se incorrer a um ensino meramente descritivista; contudo, ao não valorizar a história da filosofia, pode-se debruçar em discussões sem conteúdo filosófico. (shrink)

Hoje se lê a parte final do Contrato Social (1762) à luz do movimento contínuo - que perpassa toda a obra do genebrino - entre o geral e o particular, entre a norma e o fato, as leis como podem/devem ser e os homens como são. A república ideal já fora toda esboçada em cada um dos parágrafos da Dedicatória à Genebra escrita por Rousseau para compor a introdução ao Discurso Sobre a Origem e o Fundamento da Desigualdade entre os (...) Homens (o Segundo Discurso publicado em 1755). Mas é no Contrato Social que as diretrizes ganham fundamento e se apresentam enquanto tratado de direito político. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I present a new model of the self-regulation of virtue that integrates perspectives on emotion, cognition, and motivation. Across three vignette-based studies in US/uk (N = 1,540), I developed through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis a multi-item measure of broadening and defensive responses, the Self-Regulation of Virtue Inventory (SRVI). I applied that measurement model to two new scenarios portraying prototypical moral exemplars (selected from a set of 12) and fitted structural models that identify key antecedents: motivational dispositions (regulatory focus (...) and hedonic orientation) and moral comparisons (opinion- and ability-based). The findings were consistent with network analysis, providing initial evidence of their robustness. By integrating literatures on motivation, emotion, social cognition and comparison within a self-regulation framework, I provide initial evidence to advance theory on moral self-regulation and moral education, with practical implications on how to maximise the upsides of virtue while mitigating or channelling its possible drawbacks. (shrink)

The present brief commentary to Englert’s recent article on Kant’s distinction between practical ideas and ideals extends the significance of its contribution by considering the psychological dimensions underpinned by those ethical concepts. According to regulatory focus theory, in the moral domain the prevention focus subsumes duties and obligations, whereas the promotion focus underlies aspirations toward virtue. I argue here that prevention motives induce the enactment of behaviours consistent with ethical rules corresponding to Kant’s practical idea, and that promotion motives inspire (...) imitation processes aimed at advancement toward the archetypal excellence of Kant’s practical ideal. I conclude discussing the relevance and value, beyond Kant’s ethical conception, of a psychological analysis of the main Western normative theories through the lens of regulatory focus and the other motivational primitives. (shrink)

A pergunta sobre o bem viver, a justiça e a reta ação moral acompanham a trajetória histórica do ser humano. Diante de uma sociedade plural e relativista como a nossa, a ética do discurso de Habermas apresentase como um procedimento fecundo de justificação e de validação do agir humano. Haure seu estatuto de plausibilidade na linguagem e se coaduna ao movimento da guinada linguística da filosofia contemporânea, que provocou um processo de revisão de todos os problemas filosóficos até então colocados, (...) inclusive a questão da moralidade. Ela parte dos pressupostos fundamentais do agir comunicativo e da interação linguística dos diversos sujeitos. Tem como meta a justificação, mediante o discurso prático, das normas, dos valores e de todos os conteúdos morais específicos de cada sociedade humana específica. Requer competência comunicativa e participação discursiva direta dos diversos atores sociais. (shrink)

El tema del fin de la vida está entre aquellos afrontados por la revista Medicina e Morale con mayor amplitud y profundización. Desde la fundación de la Revista hasta hoy se cuentan más de 70 publicaciones en la materia entre contribuciones científicas, editoriales y artículos colocados en la rúbrica El debate en Bioética. Las temáticas tratadas pueden ser de este modo clasificadas: muerte en general; eutanasia; muerte cerebral ; ensañamiento terapéutico; cuidados paliativos y asistencia al moribundo; rechazo actual de los (...) tratamientos; estados vegetativos; declaraciones anticipadas de tratamiento ; testamento biológico. Diversas son las perspectivas de reflexión y la integración entre los diversos conocimientos que se descubren en la lectura de las numerosas contribuciones presentes en la revista. Las cuestiones del "fin de la vida" han sido afrontadas desde un punto de vista ético, pero también clínico y médico-legal, biojurídico, deontológico, antropológico-filosófico, con una mirada siempre atenta a las controversias que han suscitado el debate público en el curso de los años.The theme about the end of life is discussed fullness and with deep analysis by the review Medicina e Morale. Over 70 articles, editorial and paper about end of life are published form the review foundation. The themes discussed may be classified like that: death, euthanasia, brain death, aggressive therapy, palliative cares, treatment refusal, post coma unresponsiveness, advanced directives, living will. Reading several articles published on this review is possible to find various useful remarks and integration between different branch of learning. The issues about end of life are discussed ethical, clinical, legal, juridical, deontological, philosophical point of view, paying attention to public events. (shrink)

Technologies like passive brain-computer interfaces can enhance human-machine interaction. Anyhow, there are still shortcomings in terms of easiness of use, reliability, and generalizability that prevent passive-BCI from entering real-life situations. The current work aimed to technologically and methodologically design a new gel-free passive-BCI system for out-of-the-lab employment. The choice of the water-based electrodes and the design of a new lightweight headset met the need for easy-to-wear, comfortable, and highly acceptable technology. The proposed system showed high reliability in both laboratory and (...) realistic settings, performing not significantly different from the gold standard based on gel electrodes. In both cases, the proposed system allowed effective discrimination between low and high levels of workload, vigilance, and stress even for high temporal resolution. Finally, the generalizability of the proposed system has been tested through a cross-task calibration. The system calibrated with the data recorded during the laboratory tasks was able to discriminate the targeted human factors during the realistic task reaching AUC values higher than 0.8 at 40 s of temporal resolution in case of vigilance and workload, and 20 s of temporal resolution for the stress monitoring. These results pave the way for ecologic use of the system, where calibration data of the realistic task are difficult to obtain. (shrink)

The unitary approach, developed in the Prison Notebooks, to the study of ideology, superstructures and language can be considered one of the most important and original contributions made by Gramsci to Marxist theory. With the definition of the gnoseological function of the superstructures/ideologies, and of the intrinsic link between ideology and language, Gramsci establishes a network of relations between “truth” and “politics”, with the mediation of the “translatability of languages”, which redefines in a substantial way both these spheres and, in (...) this way, also the notion of “universality”. (shrink)

Peter D. Thomas’s book The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism draws us to reflect on a point that Gramsci’s interpreters have often neglected: the particular structure of the Prison Notebooks, i.e., the ways in which the text was constituted and, dependent on that, the fundamental methodological criteria for its interpretation. Thomas’s book is a consummate synthesis between the deep and detailed study of the Notebooks text and the need to reconstruct some order within; between close historicalphilosophical assessment and theoretical (...) proposal within contemporary Marxist (and para-Marxist) debate. Consequently, this book confronts us – as Gramsci’s present-day readers – with a task that no-one can face alone, but that is nonetheless extraordinarily urgent: the task of intervening in the debate within the post-modern and post-Marxist Left so that the link between Marxism and philosophy is resumed, starting out from Gramsci himself. In short: a revival of Marx through Gramsci, through – in turn – a return of the philosophy of praxis as Marxism for our own day. (shrink)

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is currently understood as a theory of power in Western, democratic societies, and therefore as a theory of cultural power (“cultural hegemony”). The aim of this article is to show that this interpretation is erroneous, at least for three reasons. Firstly, because the notion of “democracy” itself has to be placed within its historical context: the meaning of “democracy” in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe was very different from what it became in the post-WWII era. (...) Secondly, because all the regimes Gramsci could have been taking into account when he wrote the Prison Notebooks were the result of the crisis of the Liberal State and parliamentarianism. Even if in different ways, political conflict in each of them unfolded in a manner that is very different from what is today presupposed by the notion of cultural hegemony. And thirdly, because the genetic reconstruction of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, as it is developed in the Prison Notebooks, will show that the core of what is usually considered the Gramscian theory of hegemony was already developed before 1926 (I shall refer to it as “standard theory”), while in the Notebooks he substantially updated this theory, in order to think the new conditions of political struggle in Italy and Europe. This revision can be summarised in three points. First: the notion of hegemony is organically combined with that of “war of position”. The latter will refer no longer the political struggle characterised by a strongly developed civil society, typical of the “West” (as opposed to backward “Eastern” context). The war of position is now the sort of political struggle that we have when huge masses of population enter into political life and actively participate in it. It thus means not a place where political struggles take place but a phase of these struggles, that Gramsci calls “culminating” and “decisive”. The image Gramsci adopts to visualise this phase of political struggles is that of two “reciprocal sieges”: of the masses to the State and of the State to the masses. Second: “hegemony” comes to mean now the means the rulers adopt with the purpose of winning the support of the masses. Politics is no longer the business of active minorities; it is now the organisation of the lifestyle of huge masses of population, in order to control their political agency (hence the notion of “passive revolution”). Third, from the above, the importance of religion follows since it is the most widespread language, as well as that of political myths which manage to mobilise politically social forces, translating religion into political action and the vice-versa, political ideology into religious faith. (shrink)

TGiulio Preti, born in Pavia (Italy) in 1911 and dead in Djerba (Tunisia) in 1972, represents one of the most subtle Italian thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century. After graduating in 1933 discussing a thesis about The Husserl’s historical significance, he connected more and more to the Antonio Banfi’s lesson of critical rationalism and he elected him as his master. Starting from Banfi’s The principles of a reason theory (1927), Preti studied in depth the program of (...) historization of the Kantian transcendental both in books such as Idealism and positivism (1942), and in Praxis and empiricism (1957), in Rhetoric and logic (1968), and then in his numerous essay studies, later collected in fundamental posthumous volumes, Philosophical essays (1976, 2 vol.). Preti’s decisive problem is the following question: how is it possible to historicize human knowledge without a relativization? According to Preti, in order to answer this question, it is necessary to acknowledge the objectivity of scientific knowledge. The objective knowledge mustn’t be confused with an absolute knowledge or, least of all, with a subjective, or toutcourt relative, knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to avoid either opposite poles, but specular, in which the different epistemologicaltraditions of the last century are, on the contrary, stopped. In Preti’s opinion, the objectivity of knowledge arises from the eidetic, linguistic and operative structures, within the limits of which develops a determinate form of human scientific knowledge. In other words: every scientific knowledge, structured into a particularscientific theory and relating to a particular technological heritage, consists of a precise theoretical-practical horizon, that determines, with Husserl’s words, a specific “ontological region”, or, with Bachelard’s words, a specific “ontogenesis”. So Preti recovers the heuristic rule of the Kant’s transcendental reason. Nevertheless, unlike Kant, Preti believes the aprioristic structures of our ideas always have a conventional and historical foundation. In this way, the Kantian a priori changes into an historical and relativistic a priori. Certainly in Kant’s opinion an historical and relativistic a priori would have looked like a “round-square”, an authentic contradiction, a pure logical impossibility. According to Preti, on the contrary, this paradoxical aspect is the true distinctive feature of scientificknowledge objectivity, which has no more any eternal or absolute value, but is always built by men born to die and is always bound to determinate historical forms of civilization. Starting from these assumptions, Preti builds, in this way, a research programme on the possibility to individualize a form of “critic ontologism”, which hasn’t any more connection with the claims and the traditional metaphysical structures of the “Being qua Being”. On the contrary, Preti thinks the only “being” we can rationally talk about is the one constituted within the different cognitive ambits. Philosophy then must be able to develop a “meta-reflection” on different knowledge elaborated by single sciences. According to Preti, in fact, philosophy is the formality of human culture, it is, in other words, a form of self-reflection by the human culture about itself. Therefore philosophy has no more any privileged subject, but it must be always able to reflect, with great theoretical humility, on the different cognitive forms, in order to study languages, structures, methods, extension and limits of the human knowledge. In this way Preti’s “critic ontologism” is a kind of historical-objective transcendentalism, able to study the different configurations of the technical-scientific heritage produced by mankind during his history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:136 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 1 JANUARY 199 ~ to the principle of acting for the common good are played down by Grant in her discussion of Locke. Nevertheless, Grant advances the important proposition with respect to the tradition of liberalism as a political doctrine that "Locke's political theory contains two tendencies that are not entirely harmonious." That is, there is an uneasy blend of radical (...) and conservative elements in Lockean liberalism, and "this ambivalent attitude is an expression of the central axis of conflict within liberal theory generally" (204). For those who seek to understand Locke's role as a progenitor of liberalism and the persistence of certain types of arguments and problems which retain their significance for thinkers who identify themselves with that political theory, therefore, John Locke's Liberalism provides an excellent starting point. RICHARD ASHCRAFT Universityof California, Los Angeles Fabio Todesco. Riforma della metafisica e sapere scientifico. Saggio suJ. H. Lambert (z 7281777 ). CoUana di Filosofia, vol. x5. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987. Pp. 348- L 3o,ooo. Voltaire expressed his view of Wolffian metaphysics in a letter to Prince Frederick of Prussia: "Ce sont des 6clairs au milieu d'une nuit profonde; c'est tout ce qu'on peut esp~rer, je crois, de la m~taphysique. "~ Voltaire's attitude towards metaphysics was not shared by Condillac, who in his Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines (1746) distinguishes two kinds of metaphysics: one, ambitious and obscure of itself, pretends to discuss the essences of beings and the inscrutable causes of things; the other, more circumspect, confines itself to the analysis of knowledge, and so provides the only possible basis for a clarification of mind; it is "la science qui contribue le plus ~ rendre l'esprit lumineux, precis et 6tendu, et qui, par cons6"quent, doit le preparer ~ l'6tude de toutes les autres." It started with Locke, and is to be treated with the same exactitude as geometry in order to give a clear and invariable meaning to the words used, and a simple and easy order to the propositions." Maupertuis, who in 1746 became the President of the newly re-founded Berlin Acad~mie Royale des Sciences, hoped for the application of mathematics to metaphysics; nevertheless, he didn't expect the same degree of certitude from the latter as from the former. 3 In 1761 the Berlin Academy proposed a prize question as to whether metaphysics were capable of the same degree of evidence as mathematics. Lambert answered the question by claiming that geometrical demonstrations might be applied to metaphysics. 4 Four years afterwards (January 1765) Lambert was enrolled as a merei Letter of 1 September 1736, in Voltaire'sCorrespondence,ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1954), 5: 232. " Oeuw-esPhilosophiquesde Condillac,ed. Georges Le Roy (Paris: P.U.F., 19~7), 1:3. DesDevoirsde l'Acadg, micien, in Histoirede l'AcademieRoyaledesSciencesetBelles-Lettres,~5 vols. (Berlin, 1746-71), 1 (1746): 142-43. 4 "Llber die Methode, die Metaphysik, Theologie und Moral richtiger zu beweisen.... "ed. K. Bopp, Kantstud,en, suppl. 4~ (1918). BOOK REVIEWS a37 ber of the Berlin Academy; in the speech he delivered on that occasion he maintained that the simple concepts first formulated by Locke were the basis of human knowledge. From these simple concepts were drawn axiomata and postulata, the starting points of demonstrations that were necessarily and strictly to follow "l'ordre et le rigueur g~ometrique. ''~ In his own research, Lambert's point of departure was the philosophy of Christian Wolff, who had applied geometrical method to philosophy and provided demonstrations of its propositions, and definitions of all its constituent terms. The result Lambert obtained is very different from that of Wolff's metaphysics, which was constructed by deduction from the most general concept of ens, elaborated through a series of classifications per genera et species. Lambert abandoned this Wolffian system of classification in order to follow the anatomical method introduced by Locke, and by which the fundamental constituent elements of thought might be reached. The metaphysics of Lambert is a reversal of that of Wolff: it is built up from simple ideas derived immediately from sense perception: these simple ideas, being indivisible, are... (shrink)

This book provides the first English translations of pivotal essays and debates on the role of language politics, linguistics, and translation in Antonio Gramsci's influential cultural theory. It also includes new works from leading and up-and-coming anglophone scholars to create a vital resource for a wide variety of readers interested in Gramsci across many disciplines including cultural studies, critical political economy, social and political theory, literature, sociology, post-colonialism, and philosophy.

Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give (...) an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails. (shrink)

Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop normative standards that allow us to distinguish between more and less legitimate forms of populism. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss populism in toto; the article strives for a more subtle result, namely, to show that liberal democracy can accommodate populism provided that the latter conforms to (...) particular discursive norms. What the article calls a ‘liberal ethics of populism’ turns out to be closely bound up with a broader ethics of peoplehood, understood as a way of articulating who ‘the people’ are in a way that is compatible with liberal–democratic principles of political justification. Such an ethics, concludes the article, inevitably has a much wider audience than populist political actors: its addressees are all those who seek legitimately to exercise power in the name of the people. (shrink)

Columbia University Press's multivolume _Prison Notebooks_ is the only complete critical edition of Antonio Gramsci's seminal writings in English. Based on the authoritative Italian edition of Gramsci's work, _Quaderni del Carcere_, this comprehensive translation presents the intellectual as he ought to be read and understood, with critical notes that clarify Gramsci's history, culture, and sources; an index of names; and a contextualization of the thinker's ideas against his earlier writings and letters. This set includes notebooks 1 through 8 with (...) all attendant notes and materials and is an indispensible resource for scholars in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Pruss proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can (...) be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated. (shrink)

Focused on city-scale automation, and using self-driving cars (SDCs) as a case study, this article reflects on the role of AI—and in particular, computer vision systems used for mapping and navigation—as a catalyst for urban transformation. Urban research commonly presents AI and cities as having a one-way cause-and-effect relationship, giving undue weight to AI’s impact on cities and overlooking the role of cities in shaping AI. Working at the intersection of data science and social research, this paper aims to counter (...) this trend by exploring the reverse perspective: how do cities affect the development, and expose the present limits, of SDCs? The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by comparing urban and nonurban environments and thoroughly examining the relationship between computer vision and city-specific sociality and form, it defines machine autonomy/automation as a function of the sociotechnical milieu in which an AI system operates. Second, and related, the paper problematizes the notion of SDCs as autonomous technologies and the role it plays in envisioning contending policy arrangements and technical solutions for achieving full driving automation. Finally, the article offers insight into a materialist and spatialized understanding of AI—namely, not as an abstract quality susceptible to replication within discrete machines, but rather as a distributed property emerging through embodied interactions among a multiplicity of agents (human, non-human, and technological) within/with their environments. (shrink)

In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt (...) for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false. (shrink)

Popular sovereignty requires that citizens perceive themselves as being able to act and implement decisions, and that they are de facto causally connected to mechanisms of decision making. I argue that the two most common understandings of the exercise of popular sovereignty—which center on direct decision making by the people as a whole and the indirect exercise of democratic agency by elected representatives, respectively—are inadequate in this respect, and go on to suggest a complementary account that stresses the central role (...) of internally democratic and participatory political parties in actualising popular sovereignty, drawing on the democratic theory of Hans Kelsen. (shrink)

Populism is widely thought to be in tension with liberal democracy. This article clarifies what exactly is problematic about populism from a liberal–democratic point of view and goes on to develop...